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Enikő Bollobás
The short fiction of Henry James offers an ideal ground for character studies, in 
particular the investigation of interactional paradigms, from an intersubjective 
perspective. Some of James’ characters are clearly defined in terms of how they 
perceive themselves and the others, whether they recognize other perspectives 
than their own, or not; whether they open onto Others, or not; whether they are 
touched by Others, or not. Other characters bear gendered marks of language 
behavior, normative or transgressive styles of speaking. In my study I explore 
these two major interactional paradigms in James’ short fiction, grounding my 
discussion in intersubjective theory, providing, along the way, an overview of the 
relevant claims of intersubjective theory that I apply in my interpretation.
I. Intersubjective theory and interactional relations in James’s short fiction
The concept of intersubjectivity was introduced in Husserl’s Sorbonne lectures 
(1929), later published as Cartesian Meditations. Here Husserl claims that the 
recognition of other subjectivities—of the existence and individual aims of Others—
provides the grounds for all ethical relations. “Within the bounds of positivity we 
say and find it obvious that, in my own experience, I experience not only myself but 
Others—in the particular form: experiencing someone else” (Cartesian Meditations 
48). This ethical relation—that includes both recognition and self-recognition, 
presence and co-presence—acts as the condition for perceiving the world from 
the perspective of the Other; in other words, as the condition of objectivity. For 
objectivity—when I realize that my perspective is one of many, therefore, I hold 
no privilege on truth—is fundamentally intersubjective. We can only experience 
the world as an intersubjective medium if we also realize that Others experience it 
differently, or if we are capable of transgressing the particularity of our perspective. 
Otherwise we do not perceive the Other as subject but only as object, the object 
of our perception.
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In his 1923 essay Ich und Du (English translation, I and Thou, to appear in 
1937), Martin Buber describes a “twofold attitude” of man to the world: the I-It 
and the I-Thou relation; here the I-It relation does not involve “the whole being,” 
but the I-Thou relation does (I and Thou 3). While the former sees the Other as 
object, the latter experiences the Other as consciousness and subject. “If I face a 
human being as my Thou,” Buber writes, “he is not a thing among things, and does 
not consist of things […] he is Thou and fills the heavens” (8). Buber insists on the 
reciprocity of this relationship, which corresponds to what intersubjective theory 
defines as recognition, claiming that the simultaneity of I-affecting-Thou and Thou-
affecting-I account for this “primal experience” (21-22) or “relational event” (33). 
Moreover—and here Buber forecasts a fundamental principle of intersubjective 
theory—, it is by this recognition of the Other that the subject comes about: 
“Through the Thou a man becomes I” (28). 
Theories of recognition emphasize the intimate connection between recognition 
and self-recognition, or recognition and self-consciousness. The self cannot 
recognize itself without recognizing the Other. This is the foundation of all human 
communication; as Jenny Slatman claims, “I recognize myself, distinguished from 
that which does not belong to me: and I recognize the Other as a being who, like 
myself, has a sense of herself and may be concerned for herself (“A Strange Hand” 
321-322). Perception, Slatman goes on, is always linked to a particular horizon 
entailing a particular perspective. But relations and consequently recognition can 
only come about if the horizons meet: if the participants share a world (329); 
“one recognizes the Other as someone with whom one shares a meaningful world” 
(340). Nick Crossley also identifies the recognition of other consciousnesses as 
the precondition of self-awareness, self-consciousness. Consciousness, he claims, 
must decenter itself, “identifying and acknowledging its own particularity as a 
perspective upon the world amongst other perspectives” (17).
James offers diverse explorations of characters who are unable to open to the 
Other and occupy a shared world with the Other, and who, therefore, are unable to 
experience the world in its fullness. Indeed, the typical James hero is a voyeur and a 
scopophiliac, whose gaze is one-directional and static. For example, the narcissistic 
John Marcher in “The Beast in the Jungle” has only attention to himself, unable to 
reverse his gaze and see the Other. The painter living in Florence, Theobald from 
“The Madonna of the Future” sees the beautiful Serafina as the embodiment of 
the perfect Madonna, whom he could use for his own purpose. Rose Agathe, the 
eponymous heroine of the short story, is but a hairdresser’s tool, an inanimate waxen 
head serving as the resting place for wigs, who the anonymous narrator falls in love 
with. In “Glasses,” Flora Saunt degrades herself to a mere commodity satisfying the 
fetishism of the men as she accepts veritable blindness when refusing to wear glasses. 
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In the story “Adina,” the young woman offers herself to the handsome peasant boy 
who has been wrongly deprived by Scrope, Adina’s former fiancé, of the carved topaz 
he found in the fields, thus claiming a ridiculously low value of herself in exchange 
for the stone piece of jewelry dating back to the time of the Emperor Tiberius.
Considering my first example only here, “The Beast in the Jungle,” it is fair to 
claim that, because John Marcher is unable to experience the world by opening up 
to the Other, he is unable to overcome his inertia. Since, as Brian Massumi puts it, 
“every perception is a creative activity” (Semblance and Event 27), he is also unable 
to commit to any creative act. He suffers because he cannot live his life in full; 
since he has no attention to anyone but himself, he is unable to read himself. May 
Bartram, on the other hand, is a perceptive woman open to the world, who faithfully 
stores in her memory all the events relating to the man, capable to call them forth 
as well. She is a good observer, who can ask pertinent searching questions too. May 
is a complete human being with the potential to creatively understand the Other; 
having allowed herself to be touched by the dilemma of Marcher, she opened up 
to perceiving and experiencing. As one touched by the Other, she manages to gear 
Marcher to his belated enlightenment. As a person capable of involving the Other 
into the creative process of perception and cognition, Bartram is both touched and 
touching, understanding and helping to understand.
Marcher is one of those James heroes who suffer for not knowing who they are. 
Because they are unable to follow with attention the events around them, they 
cannot see their own selves either, no matter with what intensity these modern 
day Narcissuses watch their images in the river. Only very slowly does he learn to 
see himself from another’s perspective; when this happens, it is too late, after May 
died. His learning curve follows what Merleau-Ponty calls chiasm, the intertwining 
of perspectives that offers knowledge of oneself. 
As soon as I see, it is necessary that the vision (as is so well indicated by the 
double meaning of the word) be doubled with a complementary vision or 
with another vision: myself seen from without, such as another would see me, 
installed in the midst of the visible” (“The Intertwining—The Chiasm” 134)
Desiring knowledge of ourselves, we must learn to be open, the Merleau-Pontyan 
thesis goes, “to visions other than our own,” which then give “the limits of our factual 
vision” (143). Indeed, this is exactly what happens to Marcher and Bartram: the 
chiasmatic state of a “reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other” (138) 
comes about between the man focused on himself and the woman helping the man 
in his search for his secret, with the “possibility for reversion” (142) taking place as 
well, as John becomes capable to turn May’s perspective into his own.
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Merleau-Ponty insists that such chiasmatic meetings are always grounded in 
perception. Only perception triggered by the meeting of two sets of eyes, two 
gazes, can set off a communication process to culminate in knowing: when I 
think the Other and understand him too. This experience of perception means, he 
claims, that it brings back the moment when things, truths, and good come to be 
constituted for us, and that this experience provides us with a logos to be born; for 
“Perception is a nascent logos” (The Primacy of Perception xv). 
By these words, “the primacy of perception,” we mean that the experience 
of perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths, values 
are constituted for us; that perception is a nascent logos; that it teaches 
us, outside all dogmatism, the true conditions of objectivity itself; that it 
summons us to the tasks of knowledge and action. (25)
Judith Butler provides another theoretical link to this problematic. In her recent 
Senses of the Subject, she devotes three chapters to Merleau-Ponty, pointing out that 
the French philosopher relies on his Cartesian predecessor of the 17th-18th century, 
Nicolas Malebranche, when setting up the three points of the intersubjective 
process. It is “the primary touch that inaugurates experience” (41), followed by 
a sense of being touched (“I can feel only what touches me,” Malebranche writes 
[42]), resulting in the sense of the I—the self who feels, knows, and acts. That is, 
the person reaches the point of subjecthood: becomes a subject capable of feeling, 
knowing, and acting.
Feeling, knowing, and acting as intersubjective processes are clearly connected 
through language. The self is forged out of dialogical events channeled by language. 
The precondition for the subject’s opening onto the Other is social dialogue. 
Marcher’s inability to feel is deeply connected with his inability to conduct 
reciprocal dialogues with Bartram. He needs twenty years to develop in himself a 
Bakhtinian “responsive attitude,” as well as an “actively responsive understanding” 
(68) of the Other. For twenty years he has no capacity for “co-creation” (172), 
and only touched by the woman’s death does he become capable of “creative 
understanding” (xiii). During such creative understanding, Bakhtin claims, 
it is immensely important for the person who understands to be located 
outside the object of his or her creative understanding — in time, in 
space, in culture. For one cannot even really see one’s own exterior and 
comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real 
exterior can be seen and understood only by other people, because they are 
located outside us in space and because they are others. (5)
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Only through the dialogic co-creativity slowly acquired during the twenty years 
of their conversations will Marcher recognize his cemetery epiphany, when he is 
touched by an unknown face which he understands to be suffering for the loss of 
his beloved. The stranger touched by loss becomes the touching, passing on to 
Marcher the capacity to perceive, to experience, and to live. In other words, Marcher 
achieves a desired sentience via two intersubjective relations, one with Bartram and 
another with the stranger, which together, intertwined and chiasmatic, reach the 
path of what Massumi, relying on Deleuze, calls becoming. Tying relationality to 
this process, Massumi calls such a process “relational becoming” (Politics of Affect 
51), emphasizing the continuous reciprocal events forging the relationship of two 
people through which knowledge of one is triggered by the perspective of the 
Other, while also opening a perspective on the world.
James often approaches this problematic from the negative: what happens when 
the characters are not touched by Others, nor do they experience any forms of 
relational becoming. The story “In the Cage” presents a telegraphist whose main 
preoccupation is to put together the details of the lives of the people whose 
telegraphs she is sending off. No matter how many details she is familiar with, 
she does not understand her customers’ true stories because she is only a voyeur, 
outside of their intersubjective dialogue. In the absence of reciprocal events, 
her deciphering proves to be false: the relationship she assumes to be a secret 
heterosexual romance is presented to the reader as a cover-up rather, and the pain 
on Captain Everard’s face is not from love but from anxiety over being found 
out and blackmailed. The woman’s fictioning of the telegraphs is then prompted 
by misperception and assumptions pre-existing the texts; her reading is based on 
her presuppositions concerning the compulsory heterosexuality of love and the 
assumption that any secret has to somehow relate to illicit heterosexual romance. 
That is, the absence of reciprocal events—of touching and being touched—
necessarily results in the absence of knowledge. And although the reader is not in 
full possession of knowledge either (James’s secrets most often are not revealed), 
we can suspect at least that the threat of blackmail is somehow connected to the 
Captain’s homosexuality. As such, “In the Cage” is yet another text with which 
James contributes to the conceptualization of homosexuality going on in the 1890s 
by claiming that understanding requires being touched, while being touched 
requires a certain intersubjective involvement, the participation in the chiasmic 
intertwining of perspectives.
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II. Forms of Gendered Relationality in Language 
Linguistic dialogue plays a crucial role in intersubjective theory, for Merleau-
Ponty in particular. For it is language that forms the “common ground” between 
the self and the Other in the “experience of dialogue”; it is language that makes 
up the “common world,” where “our perspectives merge into each other” (The 
Phenomenology of Perception 354). And although we may never be able to fully 
understand the Other’s perspective—“The grief and anger of another have never 
quite the same significance for him as they have for me. For him these situations 
are lived through, for me they are displayed” (356)—we can construct a common 
ground in which to communicate. This linguistic common ground emerges out 
of a pact, Merleau-Ponty insists, as the “interworld” that is the project of both 
participating parties (357).
Linguistic common ground serves as the repository of cultural scripts. In his The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956), Erving Goffman writes about “abstract 
standards” (26) or “abstract stereotyped expectations” (27) that the individual 
learns so that he or she would know what “officially accredited values of the 
society” to appropriate during the social performances or presentations of the self 
(35). While Goffman defines the self as the “product of a scene that comes off […], 
as a performed character” (252) or a “dramatic effect” (253), he also allows for a 
discursive common ground collecting the social scripts that regulate the dramatic 
staging of the self.
Nancy Chodorow and Jessica Benjamin offer a different perspective on relational 
events. Writing about “the relational construction of the self ” (Chodorow 149), 
Chodorow ties the “search for meaningful subjectivity” (145) to the topic 
of intersubjectivity. Refuting the Freudian ideal of individuality defined by 
separation—an ideal tailored exclusively to male autonomy and individuality—
Chodorow emphasizes the conceptualization of “the self as inexorably social and 
intrinsically connected” (158). While Freud’s model excludes the role of others 
in the construction of the self, object-relations theory “directs attention to the 
interrelations of individuality and collectivity or community” (152), and, as a 
consequence, to the role mutual engagements play in the production of the self. 
Benjamin also emphasizes that the traditional psychoanalytic model, valorizing 
separation and differentiation, is helpful in interpreting relationships of domination 
only, where the separating party realizes his domination over the person he separated 
from. “The problem of domination begins with the denial of dependency” (“Master 
and Slave” 283), she writes. This concept of the subject shows a fundamental 
difference from that of critical feminist psychoanalytical theory, which posits a 
concept of individualism that balances separation and connectedness, agency, and 
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relatedness (“A Desire of Ones’s Own” 82). Benjamin insists that the recognition 
of female desire—“that one is a subject of desire, an agent who can will things and 
make them happen” (87)—serves as the precondition of female subjectivity. For 
the intersubjective mode, Benjamin asserts, “assumes the paradox that in being 
with the Other, I may experience the most profound sense of self ” (92). Breaking 
with “the logic of only one subject” (Shadow of the Other 82), Benjamin’s paradigm 
allows for symmetrical relations between two subjects. According to Benjamin’s 
“intersubjective view,” “the individual grows in and through the relationship to 
other subjects”; for “the Other whom the self meets is also a self, a subject in his or 
her own right” (Bonds of Love 19-20).
Linguistic dialogue serves as an important pillar in Butler’s intersubjective theory. 
In her Adorno lectures, given in 2003 and published in 2006 as Giving an Account 
of Oneself, she takes Nietzsche’s starting point claiming, “I begin my story of myself 
only in the face of a ‘you’ who asks me to give an account” (11). Butler connects 
linguistic context, narrativity, and dialogical relation with the recognition of the 
Other. Here the illocutionary act of performing the self and the perlocutionary act 
of persuading the Other meet as they produce an intersubjective relation together. 
Reinforcing the intersubjective claim concerning the linguistic common ground, 
Butler also emphasizes that the recognition of the Other and being recognized 
by the Other can only take place in language (28). For it is language that makes 
possible narrative recognition and self-narration conducted in order to achieve 
this recognition; this happens within a linguistic-dialogical situation, where not 
only is the Other, the addressee of self-narration, present, but also the possibility 
of persuading the Other. Our narrative self is produced as we talk to someone; the 
self is born out of a web of relations, when one body talks to another. “My efforts 
to give an account of myself founder in part because I address my account, and 
in addressing my account I am exposed to you” (38). Subjectivity, then, is always 
relational: “the only way to know oneself is through a mediation that takes place 
outside of oneself ” (28). Recognition and self-recognition are, in short, linguistic 
(or narrative) acts. As such, Butler’s concept of intersubjectivity accommodates 
discursivity and narrativity, the self/Other communicative situation, and the idea 
of mutual recognition.
James was acutely interested in gendered forms of relationality and the ways 
language frames gender positions in intersubjective relations. Throughout his 
career he was preoccupied with the characteristic features of female speech, the 
significance of silence surrounding women, as well as the subversive act of a woman 
coming to speak. His critics seem to be in agreement on the peculiar features of 
the way James’s characters speak. Among these, Ralf Norrman discusses referential 
uncertainty or ambiguity, especially the “confusion in pronominal reference” 
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leaving open the question of “who is who” (1); intersentence links suggesting 
hesitation and the understanding that nothing is ever final; as well as “changes in 
position” (3), also suggesting insecurity and instability. Although Norrman does 
not interpret these features as gendered, subsequent research in female language—
that of Robin Lakoff, Carol Gilligan, Deborah Cameron, and Pierre Bourdieu, 
among others—clearly assigns these marks to women. Studying gendered linguistic 
norms, Lakoff concludes that language, including its most concrete syntactic and 
lexical structures, displays marks of power or powerlessness; “language use can tell 
us about the nature and extent of any inequity” (39). Gilligan claims that patriarchy 
demands a very specific language use of women; as the manifestation of such social 
scripts as empathy and intersubjectivity, this voice will be softer and more insecure 
than that of men, reflecting “the limits of autonomy and control” (172). Cameron 
describes the “weak, trivial, and deferential style” of women as deriving from their 
“training in how to be subordinate” (23), while Bourdieu insists on a symbolic 
relation between language on the one hand and wealth and power on the Other. 
As he claims, “utterances are not only […] signs to be understood and deciphered, 
they are also signs of wealth, intended to be evaluated and appreciated, and signs of 
authority, intended to be believed and obeyed” (67). And since patriarchy forbids 
autonomy and self-confidence for women, including female voice, it is no wonder 
that hesitancy, uncertainty, insecurity, indecision, and vacillation are understood 
as marks of women’s language.
James’s short piece entitled “The Story in It” offers an intriguing staging of the 
linguistic codes of gender. The speech of the two women protagonists, Mrs. Dyott 
and Maud Blessingbourne is characterized by exactly those features described by 
Norrman, namely, referential uncertainty or ambiguity, intersentence links, and 
a general sense of hesitancy manifest in a linguistic yielding to the male speaker, 
Colonel Voyt. As Donatella Izzo observes, “Maud uses interrogative, tentative, and 
reticent tones, and Mrs. Dyott only speaks to echo someone else’s words” (217). 
As so many other James pieces, this story is characterized by “the Jamesian poetics 
of the narratibility of a nonstory,” as Izzo puts it, (216), suggesting, in other words, 
that, apart from the power game of appropriating or not appropriating language, 
nothing actually happens. Their three-way dialogue hides an intricate triangular 
desire that encompasses two desiring women and one man, the common object of 
their longing. How very different this triangle is from the dominant intersubjective 
model captured by Claude Lévi-Strauss, René Girard, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, 
and Mary Jacobus, in which woman acts as the mediator and vehicle between the 
homosocial desires of men. Not only are the gender positions reversed in the James 
story, but the direction of desire too: it is not the man who mediates between the 
desires of the women, nor do the women desire each other. Moreover, the women 
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seem to be unable to give voice to their desires. In other words, although women 
start to own desire, their social subjection continues to gain expression in female 
silence and linguistic insecurity.
Female silence gets foregrounded in several James texts problematizing 
language and in particular the absence of speech as marks of one-directional and, 
consequently, failed attempts at intersubjective relations, as well as the symbolic 
linguistic manifestations of power structure. Intersubjectivity, whether successful 
or failed, is regularly treated in terms of gender binaries, assigning first-person 
speech to men and hesitancy and silence to women.
“The Beast in the Jungle” offers one of the most memorable cases of female 
silence. Throughout this story that I have already discussed earlier from a different 
perspective, the woman does nothing else but listen to the man. John Marcher, the 
protagonist portrayed as an extreme narcissist speaks to his listener for twenty years 
about his grand secret, hoping that the woman will help him uncover its content 
(which he himself does not know). The secret never revealing itself is the overriding 
theme of the story, the same as the theme of the decades-long asymmetrical 
encounter, assigning to woman the patriarchal role of the patient listener and 
to the man the no less patriarchal role of the self-centered speaker. While the 
subject of the story as well as their dialogue manqué refers to the secret homosexual 
desire of Marcher, the behavior of the woman participating in this search points at 
another, no less silenced secret, the meaning of female listening and female silence. 
In other words, James presents the mysterious silence surrounding the taboo topic 
of homosexuality in such a way that he discusses at the same time another taboo 
topic relating to female submission coded in gendered discourse.
In some other stories, however, James seems to revise this binary gender script. 
For beside presenting characters who fully appropriate the linguistic codes of 
femininity, the author introduces women who demand a voice of their own in 
a subversive act that is allowed at times but forbidden at others. This is a radical 
innovation indeed, explicitly countering the traditional patriarchal interpretation 
of the relationship between gender and language.
The punishment of the woman who speaks provides the theme of the story “The 
Visits,” in which the young Louisa Chantry must die after she repeatedly proclaims 
her love for Jack Brandon, thereby transgressing the normative Victorian gender 
script concerning the unsayability of female desire. What complicates her crime 
is the fact that her admission comes at her own initiative (she speaks “first”), and 
not as a response to the man’s confession. As such, female autonomy does not 
only violate Victorian etiquette but the whole Western patriarchal set of norms 
concerning the demand that woman keep quiet and wait to be addressed by the 
man.
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Side by side with woman respecting patriarchy’s gender scripts James presents 
several woman characters who proclaim themselves autonomous subjects and even 
agents, having appropriated agency by some form of Foucauldian assujettissement: 
they look, speak, and act. This is indeed a most revolutionary feature of James’s 
writing, assigning individual personhood through relationality to women; as Joyce 
Warren points out, “What is revolutionary about Henry James’s The Portrait of a 
Lady (1880) is his depiction of the American individualist as a woman” (231), that 
is, his recognition of “the personhood of women” (239).
Agency appropriated by woman through language is problematized in “Julia 
Bride.” The beautiful young woman gains a bad reputation in society because 
her mother had been married and divorced several times; moreover, her own 
engagements were broken several times. In order to save her reputation, Julia devises 
an elaborate performance involving friends, the mother’s former husbands and her 
own former fiancés who are to attest to the fact that neither of the women are to 
blame for the liaisons gone wrong. In this extraordinary story we hear the thoughts 
of the woman as the speaker of third-person internal monologues reflecting the 
thinking mind of a person learning to claim agency to herself. The free indirect 
discourse reveals a woman who refuses victimhood; she does this by adopting a 
speech style that goes counter to all norms, approaching the speaking voice usually 
associated with men.
The female protagonist of “Georgina’s Reasons” also belongs among James’s 
women who speak (and speak a lot). Georgina is a sexual creature driven by her 
desires; she is an autonomous and assertive young woman who actually commits 
the crime of bigamy by first marrying the navy officer Raymond Benyon and later 
a wealthy businessman. She cleverly evades getting into trouble because the first 
husband is tied by the prenuptial promise to keep silent about the marriage. Such 
silencing of the man reverses the traditional gender division assigned to man as 
speaking agency: while Georgina speaks incessantly, repeatedly explaining, in a 
most self-conscious manner, the reasons behind her acts, the man is sentenced to 
silence. Georgina’s transgression is twofold: not only does she appropriate language 
from the man, she does this in order to satisfy her sexual desire, by violating the 
laws of patriarchy with both acts. 
Similarly active and assertive is the heroine of the story “Mora Montravers,” 
who decides to marry, albeit as a formality, Walter Puddick, the genius artist with 
whom she had studied painting. With her marriage scheme she aims to secure 
the annuity from her aunt and thereby to realize her artistic aspirations. Mora is 
a thinking woman with her own voice: a heroine, as Izzo points out, “who knows 
and who wills, and she is a winner” (258). That is, countering the patriarchal 
script and appropriating language from men, she forges her own agency. From an 
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intersubjective perspective one can posit that the antipatriarchal Mora conducts a 
dialogue with the scripts of patriarchy when reversing the roles assigned to men 
and women; not only does the woman come to speech here but assigns the female 
position of silence to the man.
James is known to have no final word on human relations in his fiction, but 
to constantly reevaluate the interactions of his characters. As he wrote to Mrs. 
F. H. Hill, on March 21, 1879, “Nothing is my last word on anything—I am 
interminably super-subtle and analytic—and with the blessing of heaven, I shall 
live to make all sorts of representations of all sorts of things” (Selected Letters 161). 
Yet “Mora Montravers,” the last story James wrote, does give his “last word” of sorts 
on a young woman with a mind of her own. As the culminating point in the long 
line of stories depicting women trying to break free, “Mora Montravers” is, as Izzo 
puts it, “the final seal to his representation of the feminine,” casting “a retrospective 
light over the long road traveled that far” (258), while also offering, through a 
deep analysis of intersubjective relations, the ultimate dream of subjectivation and 
agency.
WORKS CITED
Bakhtin, Mikhail. Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. Trans. Vern W. McGee. Ed. 
Caryl Emerson, Michael Holquist. Austin: U of Texas P, 1986.
Benjamin, Jessica. Shadow of the Other—Intersubjectivity and Gender in 
Psychoanalysis. New York: Routledge, 1988.
Benjamin, Jessica. The Bonds of Love—Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of 
Domination. New York: Pantheon Books, 1988.
Benjamin, Jessica. “Master and Slave—The Fantasy of Erotic Domination.” Powers 
of Desire. The Politics of Sexuality. Ed. Ann Snitow, Christine Stansell-Sharon 
Thompson. New York: Monthly Review P, 1983. 280–99.
Benjamin, Jessica. “A Desire of One’s Own. Psychoanalytic Feminism and 
Intersubjective Space.” Feminist Studies, Critical Studies. Ed. Teresa de Lauretis. 
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1986. 78–101.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-18997-7_6
Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power. Ed. John B, Thompson. Trans. 
Gino Raymond, Matthew Adamson. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991.
32
Buber, Martin. I and Thou. Trans. Ronald Gregor Smith. New York: Scribner, 
1958.
Butler, Judith. Giving an Account of Oneself. New York: Fordham UP, 2005.
https://doi.org/10.5422/fso/9780823225033.001.0001
Butler, Judith. Senses of the Subject. New York, Fordham UP, 2015.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780823264698
Cameron Deborah, ed., The Feminist Critique of Language – A Reader. London: 
Routledge, 1990.
Chodorow, Nancy J. Feminism and Psychoanalytic Theory. New Haven: Yale UP, 
1989.
Crossley, Nick. Intersubjectivity—The Fabric of Social Becoming. London: Sage 
Publications, 1996.
Gilligan Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. 
Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1982.
Girard, René. Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, Self and Other in Literary Structure. 
Trans. Yvonne Freccero. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1972.
Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York, Doubleday, 
1959.
Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
Izzo, Donatella. Portraying the Lady: Technologies of Gender in the Short Stories of 
Henry James. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 2001.
Jacobus, Mary. Reading Woman: Essays in Feminist Criticism. New York. Columbia 
UP, 1986.
https://doi.org/10.7312/jaco92530
James, Henry. Selected Letters. Ed. Leon Edel. Boston: Harvard UP, 1987. 
Lakoff, Robin. Language and Woman’s Place: Text and Commentaries. Ed. Mary 
Bucholtz. New York: Harper, 2004.
Lévi-Strauss, Claude. The Elementary Structures of Kinship. Trans. John Richard 
von Sturmer, James Harle Bell, Rodney Needham. Boston: Beacon P, 1969.
33
Massumi, Brian. Politics of Affect. Cambridge: Polity, 2015.
Massumi, Brian. Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts. 
Cambridge: The MIT P, 2013.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Phenomenology of Perception. Trans. Colin Smith. 
London: Routledge, 1962/1992.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. “The Intertwining—The Chiasm.” The Visible and the 
Invisible. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1968. 130-155.
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on the 
Phenomenological Psychology, the Philosophy of Art, History and Politics. Trans. 
James M. Edie. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 1964.
Norrman, Ralf. The Insecure World of Henry James’s Fiction: Intensity and Ambiguity. 
London: Macmillan P, 1982.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-16824-8
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. Between Men, English Literature and Male Homosocial 
Desire. New York. Columbia UP, 1985.
https://doi.org/10.7312/sedg90478
Slatman, Jenny. “A Strange Hand: On Self-Recognition and Recognition of 
Another.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2009). 321-342. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-009-9127-5
Warren, Joyce W. The American Narcissus: Individualism and Women in Nineteenth-
Century American Fiction. New Brunswick: Rutgers UP, 1989.
